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This paper presents an overview about the evaluation of risks and vulnerabilities in a web 
based distributed application  by emphasizing aspects concerning the process  of security 
assessment with regards to the audit field. In the audit process, an important activity is 
dedicated to the measurement of the characteristics taken into consideration for evaluation. 
From this point of view, the quality of the audit process depends on the quality of assessment 
methods and techniques. By doing a review of the fields involved in the research process, the 
approach wants to reflect the main concerns that address the web based distributed 
applications using exploratory research techniques. The results show that many are the 
aspects which must carefully be worked with, across a distributed system and they can be 
revealed by doing a depth introspective analyze upon the information flow and internal 
processes that are part of the system. This paper reveals the limitations of a non-existing 
unified security risk assessment model that could prevent such risks and vulnerabilities 
debated. Based on such standardize models, secure web based distributed applications can be 
easily audited and many vulnerabilities which can appear due to the lack of access to 
information can be avoided. 
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Web-based distributed applications 
Since earliest stages of distribute systems, 
auditing was used to prevent unwanted intrusion 
into the systems or other kinds of attacks [1]. The 
exposure of distribution in the sense of various 
points of accessing resources has made from this 
field an uncertain bay of processes which could 
easily be exploited. 
Web-based distributed applications represent 
complex software applications based on client-
server architecture that deliver information and 
services using HTML and XHTML visual 
interfaces. This type of applications integrates 
various components: 
  multimedia elements like sound, video and 
interactive media clips; 
  server-side processing routines developed in 
various programming languages like ASP, 
ASP.NET, PHP, JSP or CGI scripts; 
  client-side processing routines that use 
JavaScript syntax;  
  logical structures that define the framework 
in which input data are processed in order to 
give needed results; 
  network structures that defines different roles 
for various application components in order 
for the system to function properly. 
In a Web-based distributed applications the user 
has access to remote resources through client 
components implemented by the application. The 
resources reside and are distributed on other 
machines and this remote processing mode is 
transparent for users. 
A web-based distributed application is broken up 
into several components, accordingly to three-tier 
architecture, as described in figure 1: 
  the presentation layer is the client, which is 
represented by a browser application; at this 
level, the client displays data received from 
the sever using XHTML forms and also 
accepts user input and sends it back to the 
server; using JavaScript scripts or Java 
applets, some processing can be done at this 
level; 
  the application layer handles the processing 
between the client and the server; the server, 
Web server, Content server, Streaming media 
server, FTP or Email server provides access 
to different services and resources; the core 
component of a Web-based distributed 
application is the Web Server which is a 
service that serves up web content; typically, 
this service listen on port 80 for  Hyper Text 
Transfer Protocol (HTTP), RFC 2616, or 443 
for  Hyper Text Transfer Protocol  Secure 
(HTTPS), RFC 2818; 
1 Informatica Economică vol. 14, no. 1/2010    153 
 
 
  the data layer separate data processing and 
offers access to data through different 
services; 
Many distributed applications use in the 
development stage a Web-based application type 
framework. The reason is given by the: 
  extended variety of instruments, 
programming environments and languages, 
techniques and methods used on a large 
scale; 
  open software technologies that reduce the 
costs for proprietary tools; 
  great number of on-line communities and 
free code libraries that reduce the cost of 
development from start; 
  easiness to combine multimedia components 
into an application.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Three-tier architecture for Web-based distributed applications  
 
There are many criteria to classify Web-based 
distributed applications. Taking into 
consideration the structural viewpoint, largely 
described in [2], these applications can be 
classified in: 
  Web-based distributed applications with 
linear structure; 
  Web-based distributed applications with tree 
like structure; 
  Web-based distributed applications with 
graph structure. 
Linear Web-based distributed applications are 
constructions formed from components that are 
launched in execution one after another. A 
component Pgi  of the E-learning application is 
characterized by the input data-set IDi and by the 
intermediary results or output data-set, ODi. 
Linear Web-based distributed applications have 
components that are executed one after each 
other and the complete execution of the 
application is considered to be completed if all its 
components have been activated, as described in 
[3]. 
A Web-based distributed application that is 
developed with a linear structure is the 
application that performs a virtual quiz or exam 
based on numerous questions. For this 
application, the data is grouped in multiple sets, 
which define the problem dimension, the 
questions, the matrix for answers and questions, 
the points of the exam session. 
The tree structure of Web-based distributed 
applications is best used in the case when at input 
data designing stage there are identified the 
parameters that help user to select various 
methods of data processing. The typology defines 
different ways of processing data and allows the 
selection of a way composed from modules that 
interact between them. The modules are placed 
on different calling levels. The components’ 
calling is determined by user’s options. 
The graph structure is the most common because 
it reduces redundancy generated by code and 
components duplication. The modules structure 
of the Web-based distributed applications 
describes an oriented graph with repeating cycles. 
By the number of users criteria,  Web-based 
distributed applications are: 
  local informatics applications with one user; 
the software product allows only one work 
session and permits access to only one user; 
  network applications with more users 
simultaneously; the software application 
manages series of work sessions attached to a 
group of users; these use the same resources 
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of application’s functions; an example of this 
software is client – server applications. 
The input data for Web-based distributed 
applications is composed by: 
  user input; applications allow user to enter 
data like text, voice and video capture that 
will be processed in order to evaluate him; 
because the application is based on a Web-
based application framework users could 
interact with various controls and select his 
options; 
  automated input; applications allow users to 
load preformatted data resulted from 
previous working sessions or from other 
compatible applications. 
A Web-based distributed application manages a 
multi-user environment and a multi-role 
functionality, [4] using all or some of the 
software components: 
  user authentication that verifies secret and 
personal information as username and 
passwords that each specific user provides at 
login;  
  user session management that authenticates a 
particular user request; 
  user permissions that define the rules 
regarding user behavior; 
  role level enforcement that assures that in 
this multi-ser multi-role environment each 
user can access only the functions allowed by 
its privileged role; 
  data access; 
  data processing represents the application 
itself. 
 
2 Risks and vulnerabilities 
The terms used in this paper are the ones that are 
generally accepted through definition in 
RFC2828 [5]. Security is viewed as a tool used to 
defend against unpredicted and unwanted actions 
that are made by a malicious user. An attack 
could exploit a vulnerability, which can be 
interpreted as a flaw or weakness in a system’s 
design, or may regard the normal functions of a 
system for taking control over an asset, in this 
way damaging the normal working parameters. 
The  risk, on the other hand, is defined as the 
combination of the likelihood that a threat can 
happen and its impact upon the system’s assets. 
The impact on the security assets is measured in 
terms of evaluating the impact upon the security 
features of every affected asset like 
confidentiality, availability and integrity. 
 
Fig. 2. Risk evaluation diagram 
 
The risk assessment process is designed to 
enhance the  audit overall process by means of 
aligning the internal audit objectives with the 
strategic goals of the organization. 
Whether we are speaking of financial area or IT 
field, which are important for the business 
process of an organization, risk assessment has 
proven to be useful in the auditing process [6]. 
A distributed system may confront various types 
of vulnerabilities [7] and risk problems. Some of 
those could have low or high impact that could 
affect the system’s functionality. If this scale is 
aggregated with the frequency scale, then it will 
result the following combination of factors and 
risk evaluation [8], presented in figure 2, which 
can explain how risks could be managed based 
on the evaluation of this two factors. 
In this scenario presented in figure 2, depending 
on the intensity of the impact factor upon the 
distributed system and on the frequency of 
happening, four situations could be deducted: 
1.  high frequency and low impact presumes that 
risks could be given for handling to another 
party which is specialized on managing risks 
and who can implement risk preventing 
procedures more efficient and less expensive; 
2.  high frequency and high impact zone means 
that those risks categorized like that are to be 
avoided or if it’s not possible, highly 
monitored and rigorous approached; 
3.  low frequency and low impact; is the 
category of risks that do not threat the 
distributed system security often and their 
impact is minimum; these risks should be 
monitored and inexpensive measures for 
dealing with them could be implemented; 
4.  low frequency and high impact; these risks 
suppose a well defined policy to be applied 
for them and measures for lowering the 
impact should be implemented even if their Informatica Economică vol. 14, no. 1/2010    155 
 
 
frequency of producing stands low; it’s better 
to prevent the risks from happening than to 
treat the consequences. 
 
Table 1. Categories of Risks and Vulnerabilities for Web-based distributed applications 
Security aspects  Possible actions to undertake 
Password 
Enforce password changes 
Log passwords reset operations 
Add structural constraints on creating password 
Prevent from sending passwords via email to users 
Have a consistent password recover policy 
Force users to change password on regular bases 
Account 
Implement a solid privilege policy 
Review account periodically 
Monitor unused accounts 
Session 
Lockout repeated failures 
Create logs about the session behavior 
Terminate inactive sessions 
Prevent roles interferences between different class of users 
Prevent elevation of privileges within the same role 
Access 
Delay repeated attempts 
Log unauthorized attempts  
Enforce access process with CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing Test To 
Tell Computers and Humans Apart) usage 
Trace account access from different IP addresses 
Data 
Protect information from unwanted changes – integrity 
Providing means of knowing the true origin of data – authenticity 
Keep sensitive data unreachable for unwanted viewers – confidentiality 
Unequivocal association between originators and data – non-repudiation 
Implementing mechanisms for data availability 
Communication 
Enforce secure communication via VPN or encrypt sensitive information 
Perform hardware and software communication regular maintenances and updates 
Use effective firewalls and protective systems for monitoring data traffic  
 
Table 1 presents a list of components related to 
the security aspects along with the actions that 
could be undertaken for increasing the security 
level of a distributed system. 
Presented list is meant to help users evaluate the 
security level of a web-based application and 
eventually reinforce their security implemented 
measures, based on the existence or not of such 
characteristics. 
This evaluation process can be done using 
vulnerabilities notification frameworks [9] that 
can create queues of messages depending on the 
severity level and delivering them to 
administrator for further attention.  
 
3 Security metrics for web based distributed 
applications 
The software metric is a mathematical model 
developed based on an equation that has the form 
y = f(x), where x is a variable or set of variables, 
that are associated with the model influence 
factors, and y is the result [10]. 
A mathematical model contains one or more 
equations, inequations and has one or more 
objective functions. Its role is to describe, to 
measure, the state of associate system. The role 
of software metric is to measure a certain 
characteristic of a software application including 
all factors that influence the level of measured 
characteristic. Being applied to all software 
application from a homogenous set, the metrics 
become the instrument that helps making 
classifications and hierarchies of analyzed 
software applications. 
Based on the mathematical model, the process of 
defining a metric consist of two different stages: 
  define the objective of the metric, the y 
variable; the objective must clearly describe 
what to measure and this requires a 
measurable element; 
  identify and define the influence factors, x 
variables, that are independent and by their 
behavior or actions determine the metric 
objective value. 
The metric complexity depends on its model and 
this may affect its quality. An increased 
complexity requires  difficult utilization 156    Informatica Economică vol. 14, no. 1/2010 
 
 
procedures and result interpretations. In practice, 
a simple and well defined metric is more 
appropriate because it is simple to use and its 
results are less prone to be misinterpreted. 
According to [11], security metrics represent 
measurable standards that are used to monitor the 
effectiveness of goals and objectives established 
for IT security. 
To facilitate understanding and easiness 
integration into an organization for all the 
security metrics proposed it is good that an audit-
based approach should be implemented in order 
to verify the compliance with the internal and 
external standards [12]. 
Metrics are different from measurements because, 
accordingly to [14], measurements provide 
single-point-in-time views of specific, discrete 
factors, while metrics are derived by comparing 
to a predetermined baseline two or more 
measurements taken over time. 
Good metrics are those that are SMART, 
meaning specific, measurable, attainable, 
repeatable, and time-dependent, according to 
[13]. In [11] there is added another attribute, 
comparable, that makes metrics useful tools in 
comparing different security measures or 
different values in the time evolution of a 
security measure. These characteristics define a 
metric as a valuable and useful tool in security 
assessment process. Metrics should be defined 
based on the risks and vulnerabilities analysis. 
The role of the metric is to analyze the measured 
level of the vulnerability or risk and to indicate 
the degree to which: 
  the security policy is implemented 
  known vulnerabilities have been solved 
  the application has been tested for unknown 
vulnerabilities 
In [14] there are described seven key steps to be 
used in the process of defining a security metrics 
program: 
  define the metrics goals and objectives 
  decide which metrics to generate 
  develop strategies for generating the metrics 
  establish benchmarks and targets 
  determine how the metrics will be reported 
  create an action plan and act on it, and 
  establish a formal program review/refinement 
cycle 
In [15] the authors examine different frameworks 
for developing security requirement and metrics 
of information systems security. The 
International Systems Security Engineering 
Association (ISSEA) has defined the System 
Security Engineering –  Capability Maturity 
Model (SSE-CMM) [16] with the goal to define, 
improve and assess security engineering 
capability. This model defines characteristics for 
a 22 steps security engineering process that is 
explicitly defined, managed, measured and 
controlled. The model represents  a guide for 
organizations that need to define a security 
assessment process used to measure security 
aspects regarding operations, information, 
networks, personnel, communications and 
computers. Table 2 describes the SSE-CMM 22 
process areas that require metrics definition. 
 
Table 2. Security process and security metrics 
areas defined by SSE-CMM [13] 
Process areas 
PA01 Administer Security Control 
PA02 Assess Impact 
PA03 Assess Security Risk 
PA04 Assess Threat 
PA05 Assess Vulnerability 
PA06 Build Assurance Argument 
PA07 Coordinate Security 
PA08 Monitor Security Posture 
PA09 Provide Security Input 
PA10 Specify Security Needs 
PA11 Verify and Validate Security 
PA12 Ensure quality 
PA13 Manage configurations 
PA14 Manage Project Risks 
PA15 Monitor and Control Technical Efforts 
PA16 Plan Technical Efforts 
PA17 Define Organization Systems Eng. Process 
PA18 Improve Organization Systems Eng. 
Process 
PA19 Manage product line evaluation 
PA20 Manage Systems Eng. Support 
Environment 
PA21 Provide ongoing skills and knowledge 
PA22 Coordinate with suppliers 
 
Another widely security metrics standard is the 
NIST 800-55, [17]. This standard defines a 
metrics development process that consists of two 
major activities: 
  define the security goals of the IT security 
program; 
  define and select metrics to measure 
implementation, efficiency, effectiveness and 
the impact of the security controls. 
The NIST 800-55, [17] standard defines the 
quality of a security metrics accordingly to a 
metric detail form that describes: 
  performance goal represents the objectives 
that are measured by the metric; 
  performance objective describes the actions Informatica Economică vol. 14, no. 1/2010    157 
 
 
required to reach the performance goals; 
  the metric that represents the quantitative 
measurement; 
  purpose describes the metric functionality; 
  implementation evidence; 
  frequency of using the metric; 
  the formula describes the mathematical 
model to be applied in order to obtained a 
numerical value; 
  data source 
  indicators represent ways of interpreting the 
metric value. 
The quality of security metrics is analyzed, also 
in [18], from the viewpoint of seven myths: 
  metrics must be objective and tangible; 
  metrics must have discrete values; 
  metrics does not require to use absolute 
measurements; 
  metrics should not to be costly; 
  metrics are useful because “you can’t manage 
what you can’t measure and you can’t 
improve what you can’t manage”, [18]; 
  it is important to define metrics to measure 
the process of information security and not 
just their results; 
  complex security metrics need to be further 
analyzed by defining metrics for their input 
factors. 
The NIST 800-55 standard, [17], defines ten 
metrics used to measure 17 Information 
Technology (IT) security topics described in 800-
26,  Security Self-Assessment Guide for 
Information Technology Systems: 
  Percentage of systems that had formal risk 
assessments performed and documented; 
  Percentage of total systems for which 
security controls have been tested and 
evaluated in the past year; 
  Percentage of total systems that have the 
costs of their security controls integrated into 
the life cycle of the system; 
  Percentage of total systems that have been 
authorized for processing following 
certification and accreditation; 
  Percentage of current security plans; 
  Percentage of systems that have a 
contingency plan; 
  Percentage of systems for which contingency 
plans have been tested in the past year; 
  Percentage of employees with significant 
security responsibilities who have received 
specialized training; 
  Percentage of agency components with 
incident handling and response capability; 
  Number of incidents reported externally to 
law enforcement. 
Another framework for vulnerabilities metrics is 
the Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
(CVSS), [19], that provides a hardware and 
software independent measurement system. The 
CVVS system goals are to define a standardized 
vulnerability scores that allows prioritizing risks. 
The metrics are grouped in three categories, 
described in figure 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3. CVSS Metric Groups [16] 
 
The Base category contains metrics that measure 
fundamental qualities of a vulnerability that are 
constant over time and environments. The 
Temporal  metrics  group  contains vulnerability 
characteristics that evolve over the lifetime of 
vulnerability but not among user environments. 
The  Environmental  category  contains 
vulnerability characteristics that are dependent on 
a specific user’s environment. 
For the risks and vulnerabilities describes in the 
second section, there are some possible metrics 
that can be used to measure them, presented in 
table 3. 
 
Base
Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Access Vector
Access Complexity
Authentication
Temporal
Expoitability
Remediation Level
Report Confidence
Environmental
Collateral Damage 
Potential
Target Distribution
Confidentiality 
Requirement
Integrity Requirement
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Table 3 Identified Security Metrics 
Area  Metrics 
Users    Password strength; 
  Number of accounts with passwords that do not expire 
  Number of accounts with manufacturers default passwords still being used 
  Percentage of Tier 1, 2 & 3 logon environments that do meet password 
complexity requirements 
  Number of distinct user accounts 
Cookies 
 
  Expire time 
  Not in-clear sensitive data 
Services (Email, 
FTP and others) 
  Total number of malware stopped at the e-mail gateway 
  Total number of messages dropped as spam 
  Percentage of total e-mail secured  
Communication 
 
  Use post requests 
  Use encryption 
  The strength of the public-key system 
  Number of potentially dangerous open ports on workstations; 
  Vulnerability port Scan of inside demilitarized zone (DMZ); 
  Vulnerability port Scan of outside demilitarized zone (DMZ); 
  High Risk Network Traffic 
  Number of shared resources 
  Number of unsecured communication nodes 
Input validation 
 
  Use validation controls 
  Use client side validation 
  Use server side validation 
System devices    Total number of devices with antivirus software installed and current 
  Percentage of all devices with all appropriate patches installed 
 
4 Security assessment process 
ICT Security is a well documented field with 
hundreds of standards that encompasses many 
important aspects starting with identifying 
resources, documenting security algorithms, 
evaluating performances and giving new visions 
for keeping up with the immense progress of ICT 
area. 
In [20] a description is presented on how 
international institutions come together for 
dealing with all the aspects which are enclosed in 
the security area. ISO is a well known network 
that is focused on elaborating standards. ISO 
involves the cooperation of almost 150 countries 
that are working in collaboration with 
international organizations, the business industry 
and government sectors. ISO technical work is 
divided in a hierarchy very well organized in 
three major categories: 
  technical committees, TCs; 
  subcommittees, SCs; 
  working groups, WGs. 
For ICT standardization ISO formed a joint with 
the IEC forming the ISO/IEC JTC 1 Information 
Technology which is dived in the following 
subcommittees that are dealing with security 
standards: 
  SC 17 Cards and Personal Identification; 
  SC 27 IT Security Techniques; 
  SC 37 Biometrics. 
From these subcommittees, SC 27 had become 
the primary resource for international standards 
relating ICT security area. The technical work of 
SC 27 is divided in several workgroups [21]: 
  Security Management; 
  Security Algorithms; 
  Security Assessment. 
  Security controls and services; 
  Identity management and Data protection; 
This aspect is also analyzed by the System 
Security Engineering –  Capability Maturity 
Model (SSE-CMM) [16], which defines what 
security assessment means [16]: 
  impact assessment; 
  security risk assessment; 
  threat assessment; 
  vulnerability assessment; 
  security verification and validation. 
In figure 4  is presented a diagram of this 
hierarchy of communities that are working 
together for standardizing all the aspects that 
appear and persists in a well defined environment 
adding value to the ICT security community. 
The first workgroup WG1 deals with regulations 
and guidelines for Information Security 
Management Systems.   
The second workgroup WG2 handles the matters 
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mechanisms within JTC1. 
The third workgroup WG3 provides useful 
information about the regulations and procedures 
of the audit process, evaluation criteria. 
 
Fig. 4. Hierarchy diagram of standardization committees. 
 
The fourth workgroup WG4 covers the 
development and maintenance of standards and 
guidelines concerning security services and 
controls. 
The fifth workgroup WG5 is dealing with 
identity management, biometrics and protection 
of data. 
The audit is a term which stands for listening the 
facts and figures provided from the activity of an 
organization. Initially, the term was used for the 
accounting and financial domain, but gradually 
spread in every area who needed a safe and 
impartial point of view on the audited activities. 
Auditors work with the full knowledge of the 
organization in order to understand the resources 
that they must check and the complete set of 
external connections with these assets. 
The audit process can be classified by its purpose 
in two different categories: 
  internal audit –  is conducted by specialists 
part of  the organization having the role of 
making an internal radiography of the target 
area with the purpose of knowing the real 
state of the organization aspects implied; 
  external audit –  used by companies for 
getting external and reliable feedback about 
the current state of the audited domains and 
gaining trust in front of their possible clients; 
is made by third parties, independent from 
the audited organization which certifies 
through special means the quality of the 
audited processes. 
The audit process for ICT field is conducted on 
several levels in which hierarchy, security stands 
on top. A computer security audit is a systematic, 
measurable technical assessment of how the 
organization's security policy is used in an 
information system. Its main objective is 
analyzing ICT area of the organization, to test the 
security levels for the respective information 
systems. In auditing the ICT field, auditors must 
approach the following directions: 
  the organization ICT resources; 
  the processes enrolled in the ICT activity; 
  the information security aspects; 
  the computer security aspects. 
The audit process follows a certain pattern to 
stand up to the existing standards and regulations. 
In order to conduct an audit process first of all, 
the auditors must find out which are the resources 
that they must evaluate and gather information 
about all the aspects involved along the activity 
line. After a well and rigorous documentation in 
the field examined the next stage is based on 
making qualitative and quantitative 
measurements and confront them with the figures 
provided by the company itself. At the end of the 
evaluation process they must provide a full 
documented report about what are the 
deficiencies of the analyzed field and what are 
the improvements that can be made to adjust the 
identified vulnerabilities and risks.  
The head management must implement the audit 
report suggestions and make a re-audit process to 
analyze its efficiency. 
In auditing a web based distributed system the 
following aspects should be analyzed: 
  the communication process; 
  the overall information process; 
  the security constraints; 
  the quality of the results provided by the 
system. 160    Informatica Economică vol. 14, no. 1/2010 
 
 
For undertaking an audit process for the 
information system of an organization, the 
organization itself must minimize the possible 
interferences between the audit and the business 
process. ISO’s standards describe a list of 
measures that could prevent the interference 
between this to processes as follows: 
  audit requirements supervised by appropriate 
management; 
  the actions taken should be only for check 
purposes; 
  the checks should be limited to read-only 
access of data; 
  back-up copies of vital data should be made 
before any audit operation; 
  all audit operations must be logged for any 
possible failures; 
  the whole process of auditing must be 
documented in order to provide detailed 
information about all the aspects involved. 
In order for obtaining the best possible results, 
auditors must be qualified for their activity and 
also must not be implied in the activities that they 
are caring out. 
As the systems are growing in complexity and 
many are the relations that come to substantially 
trigger chain of decisions from the organization 
management, the common ways of auditing such 
systems are beginning to be inefficient. In this 
direction, automated auditing processes had been 
developed for diminishing the need of human 
supervision. Although these kinds of systems 
could not carry the audit process all the way and 
manually auditing procedures must be enrolled, 
they somehow tend to add a plus value to the 
overall process, doing repeatedly automated 
procedures that facilitates and improve the audit 
end results. 
Many studies revealed that the need of audit 
automation is increasingly growing based on the 
exponential growth of the complexity level of 
such systems. In [22] are presented ways of 
achieving audit automation by the use of security 
design patterns. But entering this field is very 
tricky, because of the imperious necessity of 
having well defined standards accepted across 
multiple different systems. Table 1  could be 
mapped on such security patterns. ISO 27002 and 
its related documents have contributed to the 
standardization of security features. 
Patterns, as part of information systems, add 
extra knowledge and help the process of 
communication as common language helps 
people understand each other. Security patterns 
could be created based on such entities presented 
in table 1. Patterns communicate with other 
patterns and are structured based on different 
criteria such as: 
  patterns for security integrity and 
confidentiality called protected system 
patterns; 
  patterns for security availability – available 
systems patterns. 
Patterns are developed based on a hierarchy of 
patterns, clustered in patterns catalogues, patterns 
systems and patterns languages. 
These security entities identified are meant to be 
part of a recurring evaluation process described 
as the audit automation in which the following 
checking could be pursued: 
  checking the existence of operation logs for 
vital processes in the system; 
  checking for the existence of software and 
hardware protective equipments such as 
authentication systems, firewalls, antivirus 
programs, antispyware, anti-phishing, rooters 
with encryption capabilities, et cetera; 
  verifying protection of sensitive information 
by means of encryption; 
  identifying the existence of mechanisms that 
allow redundancy in case of unavailability, 
back-up systems & policies; 
  testing for techniques and algorithms used in 
identifying losses of data integrity such as 
hash functions; 
  searching for vulnerabilities that could have 
passed undetected by the IT security 
department. 
All these tests that must be referenced by an audit 
process could be automatically implemented and 
launched to bring efficiency and reliability to the 
overall process of auditing web based distributed 
systems. 
The security assessment could be compared with 
a test process that analyzes the application 
behavior when it is tested against known 
vulnerabilities. From this point of view, the 
security assessment process  is divided in two 
type of analysis white box and black box. 
Black box security assessment process is based 
on the fact that the auditor does not have 
knowledge about the source code, documentation 
or server logs. In this case, the assessment 
process is conducted based on general attacking 
methods that require: 
  Analyze application interface 
  Gather information about the application 
  Knowledge about known vulnerabilities 
  General methods of attacking security 
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experienced auditors or security testers that 
simulate real attacks. Depending on the results, 
the audit process can validate the application 
security level or may reveal vulnerabilities that 
were not considered. 
White box security assessment process is 
conducted  based on application documentation 
and specifications. Its goal is to test and validate 
that the implementation of proposed and 
described security measures has been done 
accordingly to the specified requirements.  The 
assessment tests and procedures are designed 
accordingly to the security specifications. Their 
objective is to validate the implementation of 
security rules and procedures.  
 
5 Conclusions 
As the systems tend to increase in complexity 
and organizations develop more their structural 
degree, reliability becomes a primary concern for 
all parties involved in the process. More aspects 
coming and being added to the systems, usually 
means more correlations to make and more things 
to manage so that the systems wouldn’t go 
unstable. For this reason audit comes to help 
organizations certify that their products are 
reliable and of good use. An auditor stands as 
factum on behalf the organization, attesting that 
the information system used for the business 
process is trustful and no drawbacks influence the 
quality implied by its products. As parts of the 
audit process tend to become automated, the 
question that arises is: “Is the audit automation a 
process that needs to be audited as well?” Those 
facts must seriously be a primary concern for 
both the audit  community and IT developers 
because of the implications that may come along 
with an unreliable product. 
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